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The Other Lessons of the Democratic Charter Commission 
WILLIAM P. KREML 
University of South Carolina 
THE OTHER LESSONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
CHARTER COMMISSION 
The final days of the Democratic Charter Commission and the 
weekend of the unprecedented Kansas City Mini-Convention were filled 
with the heat of the battles over quotas, affirmative action plans, pro-
portional representation and the more or less classic Democratic Party 
battles between the old guard and the reformist insurgents. The last 
meeting of the Democratic Charter Commission had ended in a dramatic 
walk-out by the Blacks, and the press was looking for a bit more of the 
Democratic blood to be spilled in the December cold of Kansas City. 
Yet, almost incredibly, the December Mini-Convention, charged 
with the task of completing the work on what was to be the first con-
stitution of a major American political party, ended what had been 
feared would be a late night session by adjourning itself with a com-
pleted document by 8 o'clock in the evening. What was even more 
startling than the fact that the meeting had completed its work was 
that it did so in what, for the Democratic Party, was a reasonably 
amicable manner. To be sure, the so-called "regulars" took a brisk de-
feat in the final hour, and within a few days, the cries from organized 
labor waxed and waned in their threat to abandon the party to the lib-
erals. But, in another sense, the immediate sting of their defeat was 
truly compensated for by a feeling of relief, for the adopted charter 
was a far cry indeed from the proposals of the earlier reformist drafts. 
All in all, there may have been some significance in the way that the 
Kansas City Convention and the preceding work of the Charter Com-
mission dealt with its problems, and, although one or two of the Char-
ter's issues may yet have to be resolved by interpretation and by the 
language of the by-laws, the resolution of the struggle in Kansas City 
was both firm and decisive, and it was one which should bring some 
hope for the long-range future of the Democratic Party. 
I 
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A SHORT HISTORY 
Looking at the Commission and the Convention in perspective re-
quires us to remember as far back as the tumultuous Chicago confron-
tation of 1968. That conventions' backlash led to a number of reforms 
within the party, and the McGovern-Fraser Commission, which later 
became the Fraser-O'Hara Commission, began to grapple with a Party 
charter considerably in advance of the Miami Convention of 1972. 
The Charter proposal which was eventually submitted to the Rules 
Committee in Miami was one which, though it had not generated a 
great deal of publicity, nonetheless disturbed a number of those party 
regulars who were familiar with its provisions. In its basic design, the 
proposed reform Charter could best be called a participatory document. 
It held within it the promise of a Democratic Party which would allow 
the kind of grass roots activity which the political mode of the 1960's 
held in such high esteem. Quite naturally, the office-holders, state party 
chairmen and other more or less established elements of the Party saw 
this as a threat to their ancient prerogatives. 
Opposition to the Charter from the regulars came late, but by 
shortly before the opening of the 1972 Convention, Donald Fowler, the 
South Carolina State Chairman, was able to come to Miami Beach with 
an alternate draft which reflected the thinking of many other state chair-
men as well as several of the more prominent labor leaders. This chal-
lenging draft was a conventional document, and admittedly one which 
changed only slightly the already existing, but non-codified structure of 
the National Democr atic Party. Its drafters, however, did endorse such 
reforms as the Convention-adopted expansion of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee, an expansion which clearly liberalized the make-up 
of a committee which previously had been almost exclusively the do-
main of large locally-orient ed financial contributors. 
Yet, if the "regulars" charter lacked originality, its responding to 
the Rules Committ ee Charter could be justified on at least two levels, 
both of which were attractive to at least some portion of the 1972 con-
ventions' delegates. The first justification was simply that the conven-
tional charter reminded everyone that the advocates of participatory 
democracy had themselves been somewhat less than participatory in 
their own process of recommending a charter to the party. Probably 
ninety percent of the Convention delegates had no idea that a charter 
had been proposed for their Party, an omission which was compounded 
in its significance by the fact that the reform proposals, quite candidly 
patterned after the European parties of the Left, would have brought 
about major changes in the structure of the National Democratic Party. 
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Of course the merits of these changes themselves were, and still are 
debatable, but the very fact that the heartiest proponents of their pas-
sage at the time of the Miami Convention, most notably Congressman 
O'Hara of Michigan, had, by the year 1974, largely rethought many of 
the most reformatory provisions, is probably the best argument for the 
presentation of the conventional draft. 
Nonetheless, whatever the relative merits of the two opposing docu-
ments, the 1972 Miami Convention played out its allotted four days, 
and thanks in great part to the intercessions of Senator McGovern him-
self, neither Charter was submitted for Convention consideration. The 
only significant change in the party structure which the delegates did 
approve involved the already mentioned change in the make-up of the 
Democratic National Committee, but the two principal questions of (a) 
delegate selection and ( b) the Party Charter were both left to conven-
tion-created Party commissions. 
THE ORIGINAL CONFLICTS 
The differences behveen the two original Charter proposals had 
been quite substantial, yet, following the 1972 convention, it was clear 
that these differences actually revolved around a relatively small num-
ber of central questions. One was the issue of membership, with the 
reformers proposing the creation of not only a card-carrying legion of 
party faithful, but suggesting the imposition of a membership fee as 
well to attest to the extent of an individual's Party loyalty. The regulars 
balked at such an appeal to European-style loyalty, and the membership 
question soon acquired the distinction of being, from the regulars point 
of view, the most unacceptable of all the reforms. 
The proposal for an off-residual year Policy Conference was op-
posed almost as strongly by the regulars, and the question of the inde-
pendence of both the Finance Council and the Education and Training 
Council from the direct supervision of the National Committee was also 
emerging as an issue for debate. As for the structure of the new party, 
the reformers' suggestions evidenced their long-held concern over the 
power of the chairman, particularly as this power was usually mani-
fested in an ability to bully the membership of the DNC. The reformer's 
remedy for this dominance was a simple one; to construct an Executive 
Committee which would not be chosen either by or from the member-
ship of the National Committee itself, but instead to create a body which 
would serve largely as a check upon both the parent committee and 
on the chairman. 
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And thus, around these and less significant structural issues, the 
original lines of division in the Democratic Charter Commission were 
drawn. In sum, the Fowler "regulars" draft essentially represented a 
position of (a) conventional lines of authority within the party stru c-
ture, ( b) a muting of policy consideration which would come from 
within the party, and ( c) a strong opposition to the notions of Euro -
pean Party membership; while the reform charter represented (a) a 
more diffuse structural organiz ation, ( b) a heightening of the Party's 
responsibility in policy considerations, and ( c) an attempt to foster 
closer personal identification with the party on the part of at least some 
portion of the citizenry. 
THE DIVISION 
The debates within the Charter Commission involved these central 
divisions between the reform and regular positions, and, as might have 
been expected, it was not long before the divisions among the members 
of the Commission began to find themselves represented by two, rea-
sonably well-defined adversary caucuses. The regulars and the reformers, 
who had learned rather quickly who was on their side and who was not, 
began to write letters, hold meetings, and compose their strategies for 
the corning battles. Of the two groups, the regulars were better organ-
ized, with caucuses being held frequently during Commission meetings, 
and the details of such strategies as timing of amendments and manag-
ing debates on the floor of the meetings being arranged in a regular 
fashion. 
The reform caucus met less frequently, and, at least at the early 
meetings, it seemed to lack the competitive precision of the regulars . 
The result, of course, was tl1at the reformers were losers in virtually all 
of the early debates, and the make-up of the Chart er seemed to be 
moving rather steadily toward that of the conventional document. 
As a consequence of these early reformist defeats , the only major 
questions which were left to be settled by the time of the Kansas City 
Convention were the questions of affirmative action, proportional dele-
gate representation and such things as the mandatory nature of the 
Policy Conference and a reformer-sponsored appeal for a Judicial Coun -
cil. Although much was written, and indeed written with some justifica-
tion about the severity of argument concerning these more or less sub-
stantive issues, the truly significant matter was that the basic questions 
of structure and form had already been pretty well decided. Some of 
the issues fostered bitter battles, as for example, tl1e debates that con-
sumed the early Charter Commission meetings over the question of 
membership. The regulars won the day, and, interestingly, their efforts 
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were largely successful because of telling structural arguments such as 
the whole idea of membership that would more than likely exclude more 
people from thinking of themselves as Democrats than it would include . 
The question of regional policy conferences was also lost to the reformers 
early in the sessions, and again, it was lost for the rather pragmatic rea-
sons that (a) the act of regionalizing the country's state parties was 
looked upon as probably more divisive than conciliatory in the long run, 
as well as ( b) that the expense of such regional conferences would 
simply be prohibitive for a party which had been having so many finan-
cial difficulties. 
In similar ways, the questions of the separation of the executive 
committee from national committee and arguments over the size of the 
national committee were slowly turned against the reformers, again for 
pragmatic and structural reasons. The Education and Training Commit-
tee, as well as the Finance Committee were also both duly returned to 
the authority of the National Committee where the regulars wanted 
them to be. 
THE LESSONS OF DIFFERENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
In reflection, therefore, the experiences of the early meetings of the 
Charter Commission and of the Kansas City Mini-Convention were such 
as to suggest that in matters of great dispute, particularly in new areas 
of debate, it is the structural or nonideological questions which tend to 
be resolved first. They, more than the ideological questions, are subject 
not only to structural solutions, but perhaps every bit as importantly 
within the context of a politically adversary forum, the issues can be 
discussed and debated in nonideological terms. 
It is one of the real lessons of the Commission and Convention de-
bates that not only are there different kinds of political arguments but 
that different kinds of arguments tend to get resolved in different ways. 
Structural kinds of disputes are subject to a kind of rationalistic discus-
sion. The reasons for resolving the structural charter issues one way or 
the other were reasons that did not create ideological favor toward one 
point of view or the other. They were, therefore, able to be resolved in 
the spirit of finding what was perceived to be the best structural ar-
rangement for the party as a whole. 
Those issues, and there were several, which could have been per-
ceived as either structural or ideological, were for the most part argued 
as structural issues and therefore again for the most part, they were 
fortunately well on the way to being resolved by the time of Kansas 
City. It was really on the more purely ideological issues, those issues 
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concerning such things as quotas, affirmative action, proportional rep-
resentation and the like, which were left for what was expected to be 
the difficult day and night in Kansas City. The resolution of these issues, 
of course, has been adequately chronicled in the media, and we will not 
review those resolutions here. For our purposes, we should reflect not 
only on how quickly different kinds of issues were resolved, as we have 
already mentioned, but on what lessons can be known from the way 
these particular structural issues were resolved among those who fought 
so diligently for their point of view. 
THE LESSONS OF RETROSPECT 
The contestants in the battle of the Democratic Charter, we should 
not forget, were people of worthy intellect and worthy ideals. Yet, hardly 
in contradistinction to the worthiness of either mind or purpose, we 
should remember that this novel assortment of people was drawn over-
whelmingly from the ranks of those who practice politics on a more or 
less regular basis in one arena or another. They were practitioners, and 
their very appointment to the Commission and to a lesser extent their 
election to the Convention, attested to their relative success in tl1eir own 
political endeavors. 
Nonetheless, although they were practical politicians who played 
out a very important role in the formation of a major party constitution, 
they at the same time may not have recognized that the very future of 
their party could rest upon their ability to square their continued prac-
tical political familiarity with a recognition of what the role of their 
newly constituted party is in the context of an increasingly troubled 
national polity. In the final portion of this analysis, therefore, let us 
examine the issues of the Democratic Charter with some greater spe-
cificity, and let us suggest that it is the structural questions, and not 
the substantive issues; those which were resolved in the early days of 
the Commission and therefore did not receive the shining publicity 
which the ideological issues did, that do in fact hold the better key to 
the lessons which we should have learn ed from the entire Charter 
discussion. 
As we more closely examine these structural issues, we can see 
that a few of the lessons are universal, and they can just as fruitfully 
be learned by one of the adversary sides as by the other. It is increas-
ingly clear, for example, not only by what is going on within our nation, 
but by what the internal politics of the commission turned out to be as 
well, that strong political parties are now desperately needed as a part 
of the American political system. The building of the two caucuses, and 
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the eventual time-saving and pain-saving bargaining which took place 
between the leaders of the caucuses, was but a microcosm of how a real 
system of viable political parties should properly perform. There is a 
synthesis of issues within the national politic, just as there was a syn-
thesis of issues with those two groups on the Commission which wanted 
either a participatory or a conventional political structure for their party. 
The very recognition of that synthesis, and the recognition of the differ-
ences between the two competitors, was itself the major catalyst which 
enabled the leadership of both sides to bargain effectively for the good 
of the whole Commission. 
Also, just as there were lessons for the entire Commission, so too 
were there unique lessons for each of the sides. The regulars should 
have learned at least two lessons from their participation on the Char-
ter Commission, the first being that they need not fear full participation 
from that great number of people who wish desperately to be consid-
ered a part of the Democratic Party. The history of political growth in 
the American democracy, a history which the Democratic Party since 
the days of Jefferson and Jackson can reasonably take a unique pride, 
is a history of the inclusion into politics of new and previously excluded 
elements of the population. Some of the regular's reservations about the 
changes in party structure were certainly justified, but the inclusion of 
widely divergent peoples, who often hold widely divergent opinions, has 
always bred new life into the Democratic Party, as well as into the na-
tion's politics. It should now be clear that the more regular elements of 
the established organization should never be afraid of such involvement. 
Secondly, the regulars may have learned even a greater lesson about 
the very topic that it was probably most correct about throughout the 
history of the Charter debate. True enough, the party structure is prob-
ably best maintained as a reasonably conventional and authoritative 
structure, but in a larger sense, the full structure of any viable political 
party should not only permit, but indeed encourage, the subtle interplay 
between those officeholders and party personnel who too often think 
of themselves as being the whole party, and those already Democrati-
cally-identified citizens who are and who simply wish to remain as voters, 
agitators, or just plain "outsiders" who sometimes give the party more 
hell than money. The resiliency within a party not only stems from a 
subtle interplay between its own mechanisms and the government's 
mechanisms, but also from the flexibility which just as firmly represents 
those often ephemeral relationships between the party structure and 
even the most occasional of party identifiers. They are all Democrats, 
and in the long run, the Party is greatly benefitted by even this occa-
sional and sometimes abrasive interaction with regular party elements. 
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On the other hand, not all the lessons of the Charter history can be 
learn ed by the regulars. The reformers demonstrated that they had their 
blindspots as well, and if two examples stand as representative, let them 
also deal with the structure of the party and the relationship of that 
structure to something outside of pure party. It was always assumed by 
the reformers that as the need for the recognition of political issues in-
creased, and as the awareness within a populace of its political nature 
increased, the political parties of that system would then need to be 
such that the contested, ideologically pregnant, issues of the day would 
be visibly pressed to the surface. To a degree, there is no argument that 
a political party must be one of the central vehicles for the raising and 
crystallization of public issues. But there are limits to such a direct rela-
tionship between issue and structure. At some point, usually at a place 
dictated by the limits to ideology which a nation's history and culture 
place upon it, the relationship between productive issue-orientation and 
streamlined political structure becomes inverse, and an attempt to breed 
political solutions through structural facilitation of raw issue input will 
more often than not become counter-productive to the party's long-range 
success. 
The other lesson which the reformers should consider also has to do 
with ideology, but it is not simply a matter of the relationship of ideol-
ogy to political structures. This is a subtler question and it has to do not 
with the relationship of structure and ideology but instead has to do 
with the tolerance of any political system for bold and sometimes abra-
sive ideological considerations. We should learn, if from nowhere else 
tl1an from the Chart er Commission's work itself, that it is the patently 
ideological questions which are the most difficult of swift and concili-
atory resolution. The United States has always deemphasized the role 
of ideology in its politics, and in part, as we said earlier, this ideological 
abstinence is a result of a uniquely American history and culture. 
Changes may well be occurring within the American political mode 
which will make ideology more important, both because of the growing 
need for synthesis in public issues, and because of the increasing weak-
ness of governmental structures, particularly that melifluous yet often 
inept institution known as the United States Congress. The reformers 
are probably right in saying that ideology is often complementary to 
operant government structure and therefore when the formula of piece-
meal solution of piecemeal problems, which has been the American 
method of public enterprise for its nearly two hundred years, begins to 
fail in bringing real solutions to highly integrated public problems, the 
role of ideology in the framing and resolutions of public issues will 
inevitably increase. 
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What the reformers must remember, however, is that there are deep 
dangers which stem from the fresh input of harsh ideological flavorings 
within a nation. Any country, particularly one as inherently non-ideolog-
ical as the United States, cannot tolerate unmasticated chunks of deeply 
abrasive advocacy with its system. Hopefully, the reformers are aware 
of this limit to a polity's ideological digestion, and hopefully, the re-
formers will remember that at least to a great degree, the issues which 
are brought before the people must be put there not by the party, but 
by the candidates of the party themselves. 
THE HOPE FOR THE PARTY 
In short, therefore, a brief review of the working out of the more 
significant debates over the Democratic Charter tells us that there were 
lessons for both sides of the Charter advocates, and that the reformers 
and the regulars alike must at least be willing to recognize that the 
responsibility for long-range stability within the American polity lies 
with the constructiveness of reform suggestions, just as strongly as the 
regulars must be aware that their day-to-day participation in the Party 
must be complemented by the continuous and often abrasive pecking 
away which comes with reform movements. 
One has to hope that the Democratic Party has now lived with the 
awful memories of the days of Chicago in 1968 long enough, and that 
as the current burdens of inflation, recession, oil and all the rest pile 
over us, the way that the Democrats did business in one set of political 
debates may serve as a lesson for tl1e party's future operation. If so, 
then the newly constituted Democratic National Party may well be able 
to play its proper role in helping to lift our country out of one of the 
most difficult sets of problems we have been in in a good long while. 
